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SETTLEMENT WITHOUT SACRIFICE: THE RECOVERY
OF EXPERT WITNESS FEES AS COSTS
UNDER NEW MEXICO'S RULE 1-068
SHONA ZIMMERMAN-BURNETT*

I. INTRODUCTION

Expert testimony is important to many facets of civil litigation.' However, fees
for expert witnesses are often substantial because experts typically demand a fee in
accordance "with their education, experience, and field of expertise."2 Given these
substantial expert witness expenses, "prevailing parties have ample incentive to
seek reimbursement of these fees as a 'cost' of litigation."3 In New Mexico, the
prevailing party in a civil action is generally entitled to recover costs for expenses
incurred in that action.4 The specific items of recoverable costs are determined by
"statute, Supreme Court rule and case law."5 The New Mexico Supreme Court has
identified section 38-6-4(B) 6 of the New Mexico Statutes as the statutory authority
for the recovery of expert witness fees as costs.7 The court has strictly interpreted
the statute to allow recovery only when two conditions are met: first, the witness
must qualify as an expert, and second, the expert must testify in the case, either at
trial or by deposition.8 In addition to this statutory provision, Rule 1-054 is the New
Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure governing the recovery of costs.9 Prior to 2008, the
rule provided that while expert witness fees for services, meaning those in addition
to mileage and per diem, were generally recoverable, their recovery was expressly
limited by section 38-6-4(B). 10
In light of section 38-6-4(B), the New Mexico Supreme Court held in Fernandez
v. Espafiola Public School Districtthat a plaintiff who settles a claim pursuant to

* Class of 2009, University of New Mexico School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Ted Occhialino
for his knowledge and guidance and to Jared DeJong and Carrie Snow for their insight and helpful comments. Most
of all, a heartfelt thanks to my father, Michael Zimmerman, for engaging in more conversations about costs in New
Mexico than any father should have to endure.
1. See Mary Jo Hudson, Expert Witness Fees as Taxable Costs in FederalCourts-The Exceptions and
the Rule, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 1207 (1987).
2. Paul M. Kolker, Expert Witness Fees as a Recoverable Item of Costs: Recent Litigation Trends, 57
OKLA. L. REv. 803, 804 (2004).
3. Id.
4. See NMSA 1978, § 39-3-30 (1966).
5. Rule 1-054(D)(2) NMRA.
6. NMSA 1978, § 38-6-4(B) (1983) states:
The district judge in any civil case pending in the district court may order the payment of a
reasonable fee, to be taxed as costs, in addition to the per diem and mileage as provided for in
Subsection A of this section, for any witness who qualifies as an expert and who testifies in the
cause in person or by deposition. The additional compensation shall include a reasonable fee
to compensate the witness for the time required in preparation or investigation prior to the
giving of the witness's testimony. The expert witness fee which may be allowed by the court
shall be limited to one expert regarding liability and one expert regarding damages unless the
court finds that additional expert testimony was reasonably necessary to the prevailing party and
the expert testimony was not cumulative.
7. See Fernandez v. Espafiola Pub. Sch. Dist., 2005-NMSC-026, 4, 119 P.3d 163, 165.
8. Id.
9. Rule 1-054(D) NMRA.
10. See Rule 1-054(D )(2)(g) NMRA. Specifically, the old rule provided that "expert witness fees for services
as limited by Section 38-6-4(B) NMSA 1978" are generally recoverable as costs. Id.
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Rule 1-068 could not recover expert witness fees as costs." Justice Bosson, in a
specially concurring opinion, took issue with the court's rigid interpretation of
section 38-6-4(B) in the context of Rule 1-068 settlement agreements. 2 He argued
that the statute produced a result that was antithetical to New Mexico's public3
policy of encouraging settlement and reducing the "burdensome cost of litigation."
He urged that for policy reasons "our courts need a rule that provides trial judges
with discretion to award costs even when parties do not engage in full-blown
litigation." 14
Since Fernandez, the New Mexico judiciary has, in line with Justice Bosson's
opinion, taken steps to address this problem by way of amendment to Rule 1-054.15
The amended rule allows for the recovery of expert witness fees including those
"provided by Section 38-6-4(B) NMSA 1978 or when the court determines that the
16
expert witness was reasonably necessary to the litigation."'
This article considers the amendment to Rule 1-054 in the context of Rule 1-068
settlement agreements, and concludes that the amended rule not only resolves the
inconsistency noted by Justice Bosson in Fernandez,but is also likely to lead to
increased settlement under Rule 1-068. This article begins by examining New
Mexico's system of costs-recovery in civil actions through discussion of Rules 1068 and 1-054 in addition to applicable case law. The New Mexico Supreme
Court's decision in Fernandez has particular relevance to this article in that it
highlights the need for the recent amendment to Rule 1-054. As such, the holding,
facts, and rationale underlying the decision are covered in detail.
Part Ell of this article demonstrates that Justice Bosson was correct in his
assertion that the court's interpretation of section 38-6-4(B) in the context of Rule
1-068 settlement agreements produced a result inconsistent with New Mexico
public policy of encouraging settlement. This section concludes that the amendment
to Rule 1-054 was the only practical way to ameliorate this inconsistency. Part IV
considers the implication of the newly amended rule and demonstrates that the rule
is likely to increase settlement under Rule 1-068, particularly in cases where the
plaintiff, as the prevailing party, 7 incurs substantial expert witness fees. This
section also offers practical considerations for both plaintiffs and defendants
contemplating Rule 1-068 settlement offers. Finally, this article identifies a
procedural inefficiency created by section 38-6-4(B)'s requirement that a witness
be certified as an expert prior to recovery of expert witness fees as costs, and
suggests a solution for remedying this inefficiency.

11. Fernandez, 2005-NMSC-026,1 12, 119 P.3d at 167.
12. Id. 1 14, 119 P.3d at 167-68 (Bosson, C.J., specially concurring).
13. See id. 16, 119 P.3d at 168.
14. Id. 1 14, 119 P.3d at 168.
15. Rule 1-054 NMRA.
16. State Bar of New Mexico, ProposedRevisions to the Rules of Civil Procedurefor the DistrictCourts,
BAR BUILETiN, Feb. 4, 2008, at 26.
17. The plaintiff is the prevailing party in a Rule 1-068 settlement agreement. Dunleavy v. Miler, 116 N.M.
353, 354, 862 P.2d 1212, 1213 (1993) (stating that the party who receives a judgment under Rule 1-068 is
considered to be the prevailing party in the action).
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U. BACKGROUND
A. Rule 1-068: The Offer of Settlement Rule
New Mexico public policy favors the resolution of disputes through settlement
rather than through litigation.' 8 New Mexico Rule 1-068 embodies the supreme
court's policy of reducing the burdensome cost of litigation through settlement. 19
In application, Rule 1-068 encourages parties to "think very hard about whether
continued litigation is worthwhile"2 by increasing a party's potential of being
awarded or taxed with costs if the case proceeds to trial.2t
Prior to 2003, Rule 1-068 was known as the offer of judgment rule.22 The rule
gave defendants an incentive to make reasonable offers of judgment prior to trial
because it allowed defendants to recover costs, even if the defendant was ultimately
the losing party. 3 Specifically, if the defendant made an offer of settlement that was
rejected by the plaintiff and the plaintiff prevailed in the case but recovered less
than the defendant's offer, the plaintiff would be required to pay the defendant's
post-offer costs. 24 In this situation, the plaintiff would also be prevented from
recovering his own post-offer costs. 25 To avoid this outcome, the plaintiff was
encouraged to accept reasonable offers of judgment.
In 2003, the nomenclature and content of Rule 1-068 changed from the offer of
judgment rule to the offer of settlement rule. 26 The rule, as amended, encourages
18. Fernandez,2005-NMSC-026, 16,119 P.3d at 168 (Bosson, C.J., specially concurring); see also 15A
AM. JUR.2D. Compromise and Settlement § 5 (2000).
19. Rule 1-068 NMRA.
20. Baber v. Desert Sun Motors, 2007-NMCA-098, 18, 164 P.3d 1018 (quoting Lang v. Gates, 36 F.3d
73 (9th Cir. 1994)).
21. See Rule 1-068(A) NMRA.
22. Id. (Committee Commentary, 2003 Amendment).
23. Id.
24. Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 354, 862 P.2d 1212, 1213 (1993).
25. See id.
26. Rule 1-068(A) NMRA. Rule 1-068(A) provides:
Except as provided in this rule, at any time more than ten (10) days before the trial begins, any
party may serve upon any adverse party an offer to allow an appropriate judgment to be entered
in the action in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the offer. A claimant may
not make an offer of settlement under this rule until one hundred twenty (120) days after the
filing of aresponsive pleading by the party defending against that claim. If within ten (10) days
after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted,
either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service
thereof and thereupon such judgment may be entered as the court may direct. An offer not
accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a
proceeding to determine costs.
If an offer of settlement made by a claimant is not accepted and the judgment finally
obtained by the claimant is more favorable than the offer, the defending party must pay the
claimant's costs, excluding attorney's fees, including double the amount of costs incurred after
the making of the offer. If an offer of settlement made by a defending party is not accepted and
the judgment finally obtained by the claimant is not more favorable than the offer, the claimant
must pay the costs, excluding attorneys fees, incurred by the defending party after the making
of the offer and shall not recover costs incurred thereafter.
The fact that an offer has been made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
When the liability of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment,
but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, any
party may make an offer of settlement, which shall have the same effect as an offer made before
trial if it is served within a reasonable time not less than ten (10) days prior to the
commencement of hearings to determine the amount or extent of liability.
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both plaintiffs and defendants to make reasonable settlement offers prior to trial by
allowing either party to make an offer of settlement at least ten days before trial.27
The committee commentary to the rule provides that, "[a]llowing either party to
make offers of settlement increases the likelihood that settlement will occur and
provides equality of opportunity to all parties to initiate the settlement process."28
Under the amended rule, if the plaintiff makes an offer of settlement that is rejected
and then obtains ajudgment in an amount greater than the offer, the defendant must
pay double the plaintiffs post-offer costs. 29 Since the prevailing party is ordinarily
entitled to costs anyway, the rule provides for double the costs to give plaintiffs an
incentive to make offers of settlement and for defendants to accept such offers .30 As
under the prior rule, if the plaintiff rejects the defendant's offer of settlement and
receives a judgment less than the offer, the plaintiff must pay the defendant's postoffer costs and cannot recover his own costs.
Rule 1-068 only dictates that costs are recoverable when the parties are unable
to settle disputes prior to trial. 3 However, parties who successfully achieve
settlement under Rule 1-068 may also be entitled to costs accrued under the
provisions of Rule 1-054.32 It should also be noted that even in situations where
Rule 1-068 governs the recovery of costs, meaning when a settlement offer was
made but rejected and the case was resolved through trial, cost recovery is still
subject to Rule 1-054. 33 Notably, Rule 1-054 affords the trial court discretion to
disallow costs, even those that are mandatory under Rule 1-068." 4
B. Rule 1-054: Costs
Prior to 1999, Rule 1-054 provided that "[e]xcept when express provision
therefore is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as a
matter of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. 35 The
phrase "unless the court otherwise directs" has been interpreted to be "an equitable
principle... [that] vests in the district court a sound discretion over the allowance,
disallowance, or apportionment of costs in all civil actions."36
In 1999, the rule was amended to include language that "[c]osts shall be
recoverable only as allowed by statute, Supreme Court rule, local district court rule
and case law. '37 In 2000, the rule was amended further to provide that "[c]osts
generally are recoverable only as allowed by statute, Supreme Court rule and case

27. See id.
28. Rule 1-068 NMRA (Committee Commentary, 2003 Amendment).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 362, 862 P.2d 1212, 1221 (1993).
33. Fernandez v. Espafiola Pub. Sch. Dist., 2005-NMSC-026, 15, 119 P.3d 163, 168 (Bosson, C.J.,
specially concurring).
34. See Dunleavy, 116 N.M. at 362, 862 P.2d at 1221 (1993). But see Montoya v. Pearson, 2006-NMCA091, 122, 142 P.3d 11, 17 (holding that the trial court had no discretion to disallow costs under Rule 1-068 because
pursuant to the rule, costs are mandatory).
35. Rule 1-054(E) NMRA 1996.
36. Gallegos v. Sw.Cmty. Health Servs., 117 N.M. 481,490,872 P.2d 899,908 (Ct. App. 1994) (quoting
6 JAMES W. MooRE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.70[5] at 54-231 (2d ed. 1993)).

37. Rule 1-054(D)(2) NMRA 1999.
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law."38 The 2000 amendment also includes an enumeration of certain items of costs
that are generally recoverable, which includes "expert witness fees for services."39
C. Applicable Case Law Interpreting Section 38-6-4(B) and a Trial Court's
Discretion to Award Costs Under Rule 1-054
The New Mexico Supreme Court first interpreted section 38-6-4(B) as it
pertained to the recovery of expert witness fees for a non-testifying expert in
Jimenez v. FoundationReserve Insurance Co. 4° In Jimenez, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 4' Following entry of judgment, the
plaintiff filed a costs bill,42 which included costs for fees of two expert witnesses
who came to court but were unable to testify because the hearing was vacated.4 3 The
defendants objected to the award of costs because the witnesses did not testify at
trial, but the trial court awarded these costs to the plaintiff over the defendant's
objections.'
The defendants appealed and the New Mexico Supreme Court was asked to
decide whether the prevailing party could recover expert witness fees as costs when
the experts were unable to testify "through no fault of either party. ' 45 The court
reasoned that costs are only recoverable as allowed by statute or court rule, and
section 38-6-4(B) is the statute applicable to the recovery of expert witness fees as
costs. 4 6 The court then interpreted the statute as creating two hurdles to the recovery
of expert witness fees: 1) "the witness must qualify as an expert," and 2) "the expert
must testify, either at trial or by deposition. 4 7 Since the plaintiffs experts did not
testify, the court reversed the lower court's award of expert witness fees as costs. 48
Seven years later, the court considered a similar issue in Pierce v. State.49 In
Pierce, the trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment and
awarded the State its costs for preparing two affidavits in support of summary
judgment. 50 The plaintiffs objected to this award of costs because the State only
"submitted affidavits, the affidavits did not contain sufficient information to qualify
[the witnesses] as experts, and [plaintiffs] did not have an opportunity to crossexamine [the witnesses] concerning their qualifications or findings."5 1 The court
cited Jimenez for the rule that the witness must qualify as an expert and testify at

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
so that the
1999).
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. (2000)
Id.
107 N.M. 322, 757 P.2d 792 (1988).
Id. at 323, 757 P.2d at 793.
A costs bill is an "a itemized statement of the amount of costs owed by one litigant to another, prepared
prevailing party may recover the costs from the losing party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 173 (8th ed.
Jimenez, 107 N.M. at 324, 757 P.2d at 794.
Id. at 327, 757 P.2d at 797.
id. at 324, 757 P.2d at 794.
Id. at 327, 757 P.2d. at 797.
Id.
Id.
121 N.M. 212, 910 P.2d 288 (1995).
Id. at 231, 910 P.2d at 307.
Id.
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trial, in person or by deposition, in order for the prevailing party to recover costs for
expert witness fees. 2
Unlike the losing party in Jimenez, in Pierce the State argued that while costs
may be limited under section 38-6-4(B), there is no such restriction on the court's
discretion under Rule 1-054. 53 Pierce was decided before the 1999 amendment to
Rule 1-054 and, therefore, was binding at a time when the rule provided that
"[e]xcept when express provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party unless the
court otherwise directs. 54 The Pierce court acknowledged that while the New
Mexico Supreme Court has imposed no limitations upon a trial court's discretion
to award costs pursuant to Rule 1-054, it has cautioned lower courts to use their55
discretion sparingly when considering costs not authorized by statute or precedent.
The court then considered whether recharacterizing the costs as those for the
preparation of an affidavit rather than those for expert witness fees would allow the
court to award these costs within its discretion under Rule 1-054.56 The court
determined that costs for preparation of an affidavit are not specifically authorized
by statute or precedent and, as such, are within a trial court's discretion under Rule
1-054. 5' However, the court ultimately concluded that the trial court abused its
discretion because the costs involved in preparing the affidavits for summary
judgment were preliminary and not directly connected with the trial.58
The Pierce decision, in its discussion of discretion, referenced Dunleavy v.
Miller,5 9 a case in which the New Mexico Supreme Court clearly articulated the
extent of a trial court's discretion to award costs under Rule 1-054. 60 While not
central to its holding, the court in Dunleavy took issue with the New Mexico Court
of Appeals' suggestion that the recovery of costs must be authorized by statute or
by rule of court. 6' Thus, in Dunleavy the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that
while it is generally true that the recovery of costs must be authorized by statute or
court rule, when neither specifically enumerates those costs that are recoverable,
"the allowance or disallowance62 of particular costs is confided primarily to the
discretion of the district court.
Dunleavy cited section 38-6-4(B) as an example of a statute granting trial courts
discretion to award additional expert witness fees beyond the statutorily permitted
one witness for liability and one witness for damages, if the court finds "that the
additional expert testimony was reasonably necessary to the prevailing party and the

52. Id.
53. Id. at 231, 910 P.2d at 307.
54. Rule 1-054(E) NMRA 1996.
55. Pierce, 121 N.M. at 231, 910 P.2d at 307 (citing Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 862 P.2d 1212
(1993)).
56. Id.
57. Id. The court's recharacterization of the item of costs in Pierce illustrates that even before the
amendment to Rule 1-054, the prevailing party to an action may have been able to recover costs for a non-testifying
expert if able to successfully convince the court to characterize the expense as a type the court could award as costs
in its discretion under Rule 1-054.
58. Id.
59. 116N.M. 353,862 P.2d 1212 (1993).
60. Id. at 363, 862 P.2d at 1222.
61. Id. at 362, 862 P.2d at 1221.
62. Id. (quoting 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 52 (1965)).
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expert testimony was not cumulative., 63 Additionally, Dunleavy stated that there
were other costs that have already been found to be within the discretion of the
court, including costs for "transcript fees, special masters' fees, filing fees, fees for
recording notices of lis pendens, fees for service of process, and receivers' fees,"'
costs for the expense of depositions not used at trial, 65 and costs of photocopies
taken of depositions.6 6

1. Fernandez v. EspahiolaPublic School District
Unlike in earlier cases interpreting section 38-6-4(B), in Fernandezv. Espahola
Public School District, the New Mexico Supreme Court considered whether a
plaintiff who accepted a defendant's offer ofjudgment pursuant to Rule 1-06867 was
entitled to recover expert witness fees as costs. The case arose when Plaintiffs Eric
and Veronica Fernandez filed a wrongful death action against the Espafiola Public
School District in November 1998 after their minor son Leon Fernandez was killed
"in an accident involving an ATV on school grounds. 6 8 On March 2, 2001, the
Espafiola Public School District, pursuant to the offer of judgment rule, offered to
settle the claims against them for $95,000 plus costs.69 On March 15, 2001, Eric and
Veronica Fernandez accepted this offer of judgment.7" On April 2, 2001, the court
entered judgment for the plaintiffs in the amount of $95,000 plus costs accrued
through March 2, 2001.71 On April 17, 2001, the Fernandezes filed their first costs
bill claiming a total of $117,999.48, the majority of which was for expert witness
fees totaling $89,274.25.72 Included within these fees was $450 for a medical doctor
and $23,766.72 for three different psychologists.7 3
The school district objected to the expert witness fees, arguing that section 3 8-64(B) mandates that expert witness fees are only recoverable as costs when the
expert testifies in the case.74 Following a hearing on the plaintiffs' costs bill, the
trial court agreed with the school district. 75 The Fernandezes appealed to the court
of appeals, which, by unanimous opinion, affirmed the district court and held that
since the plaintiffs' experts did not testify at trial or by deposition, their expert
witness fees were non-recoverable as costs by virtue of section 38-6-4(B). 76
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the court of
appeals and the district court by holding that the Fernandezes could not recover

63. Id. at 363, 862 P.2d at 1222 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 38-6-4 (1987)).
64. Id. (citing Pioneer Sav. & Trust v. Rue, 109 N.M. 228, 231, 784 P.2d 415,418 (1989)).
65. Id. (citing Davis v. Severson, 71 N.M. 480, 490, 379 P.2d 774, 784 (1963)).
66. Id. (citing Budagher v. Surnyland Enters., Inc., 90 N.M. 365, 367, 563 P.2d 1158, 1160 (1977)).
67. The Fernandez case was filed in the district court in 1998. At that time, Rule 1-068 was known as the
Offer of Judgment rule. See Rule 1-068 NMRA (Committee Commentary, 2003 Amendment).
68. Fernandez v. Espafiola Pub. Sch. Dist., 2004-NMCA-068, 1, 92 P.3d 689, 689-90.
69. Id.
70. Plaintiff-Petitioner's Brief in Chief at 1, Fernandez v. Espafiola Pub. Sch. Dist., 2005-NMSC-026, 199
P.3d 163 (No. 28,648).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2. These are the costs addressed in the plaintiff's brief; the remaining costs accrued by the plaintiff
are not included in the brief. See id.
73. Id.
74. Fernandez v. Espafiola Pub. Sch. Dist., 2004-NMCA-068, 1 2, 92 P.3d 689, 690.
75. Id.
76. Id. 111, 92 P.3d at 692.
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their expert witness fees as costs.77 The court found that the plain language of
section 38-6-4(B) establishes two requirements for the recovery of expert witness
fees: (1) the witness must be certified as an expert, and (2) must have "testified in
the cause in person or by deposition."7 "
The plaintiffs argued on appeal that while section 38-6-4(B) allows a district
court to award costs for the fees of testifying experts, it does not preclude a trial
court from exercising its discretion to award costs when the expert witness does not
testify in the cause.7 9 The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals
and rejected this argument as "particularly untenable in light of the plain language
in the statute."' In addition to the plain language of the statute, the court relied on
its 1988 decision in Jimenez as controlling precedent, concluding that expert
witness fees were not recoverable unless the expert actually testified at trial.8' The
plaintiffs argued that the court's more recent opinions in Dunleavy v. Miller?2 and
Gillingham v. Reliable Chevrolet, Inc. 83 represented a departure from the court's
strict interpretation of section 38-6-4(B) in Jimenez' and argued that the court
should rely on these cases instead.85
In Dunleavy the New Mexico Supreme Court stated that a trial court should
"exercise [its] discretion sparingly when considering expenses not specifically
authorized by statute and precedent. 86 The plaintiffs in Fernandez argued that the
Dunleavy court's acknowledgment that a trial court has discretion to award costs
meant that courts have discretion to award expert witness fees as costs, even when
the witness does not testify at trial.8 7 The court disposed of this argument by
pointing out that the recovery of expert witness fees as costs is governed by statute
and, therefore, does not fall within the confines of the trial court's discretion
acknowledged in Dunleavy.88
Notably, the discretion discussed in Dunleavy specifically referenced a trial
court's discretion to award costs not covered by statute or precedent.89 In fact,
Dunleavy specifically addressed section 38-6-4(B) and described it as an example
of statutory authority for the recovery of costs. 90 Plaintiffs claimed that when
referencing section 38-6-4(B) in its discussion, the Dunleavy court showed no
intention of modifying, limiting, or restricting its earlier statement that a trial court
should exercise its discretion sparingly.9 ' The Fernandezcourt disagreed and stated

77. Fernandez v. Espafiola Pub. Sch. Dist., 2005-NMSC-026,'j 1, 119 P.3d 163, 164.
78. Id. 1 4, 119 P.3d at 165. The court explained that the goal of any statutory construction is "to give full
give words of a statute their plain meaning unless the
effect to the intent of our Legislature." Id. The court will
legislature expressly and clearly expresses a contrary intent. id.
79. Id. 6, 119 P.3dat 165.
80. Id. (quoting Fernandez v. Espafiola Pub. Sch. Dist., 2004-NMCA-068, 1 7, 92 P.3d 689, 691).
81. Id. 5, 119 P.3d at 165.
82. 116 N.M. 353,868 P.2d 1212 (1993).
83. 1998-NMCA-143, 966 P.2d 197.
84. Fernandez, 2005-NMSC-026, 7, 119 P.3d at 166.
85. Id.
86. Dunleavy, 116 N.M. at 363, 868 P.2d at 1222.
87. Fernandez,2005-NMSC-026, 1 8, 119 P.3d at 166.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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that by including the statute as an example of statutory authority for the recovery
of expert witness fees as costs, it firmly distinguished the recovery of expert witness
expenses from those costs that could be awarded sparingly within the court's
discretion.92 Thus, as shown by Fernandez, the supreme court has been unwilling
to create a separate category of costs for expert witness fees that are recoverable
within the trial court's discretion.93
In addition, the Fernandez court found there was no support for the plaintiff's
argument that Dunleavy represented a departure from Jimenez.94 To the contrary,
the court claimed Dunleavy offered support for its holding in Jimenez.95 In
discussing section 38-6-4(B), the court in Dunleavy commented that the statute
granted a trial court discretion to award costs for expert witness fees, even when
those expert fees exceed the cost recovery permitted for one liability expert and one
damages expert. However, this discretion is limited, narrowly, by the requirement
that a court find "that the additional expert testimony was reasonably necessary to
the prevailing party and the expert testimony was not cumulative." 96 It is the use of
the word "testimony" here that the court claims supports the conclusion in Jimenez
that an expert must testify in the case in order for costs to be recoverable. 97
The court further cited its holding in Pierce v. State98 as additional support for
its adherence to Jimenez and to counter the plaintiffs' argument that Dunleavy
represented a shift away from Jimenez.99 In Pierce,the trial court awarded the State,
as the prevailing party, costs for affidavits prepared by expert witnesses submitted
in support of summary judgment." ° The New Mexico Supreme Court, using
Jimenez as its authority, overturned the trial court and held that the State was not
entitled to recover these costs because the witnesses were not qualified as experts
and did not testify at trial, in person or by deposition.' 1
Fernandez also overturned a portion of Gillingham v. Reliable Chevrolet,'0 2
which potentially supported the plaintiffs' interpretation of section 38-6-4(B).' 3 In
Gillingham,the court "awarded costs for two potential expert witnesses who did not
testify at trial."'" The court of appeals upheld this award of costs by relying on its
earlier opinion in Bower v. Western Fleet Maintenance.0 5 In Bower, the court
considered the recovery of costs under section 52-1-35,1" a worker's compensation

92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 363, 862 P.2d 1212, 1222 (1993)).
97. Id.
98. 121 N.M. 212, 910 P.2d 288 (1995).
99. Fernandez,2005-NMSC-026, 10, 119 P.3d at 167.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 1998-NMCA-143, 966 P.2d 197.
103. Fernandez,2005-NMSC-026, 1 9, 119 P.3d at 166.
104. Id.
105. 104 N.M. 731, 726 P.2d 885 (1986).
106. NMSA 1978, § 52-1-35(B) (repealed 1986) liberalized the standard by which a court may award certain
costs in worker's compensation cases by applying an abuse of discretion standard. See Fernandez,2005-NMSC026, 19, 119 P.3d at 166.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

07
provision, rather than section 38-6-4(B), as was the case in Gillingham.' The
Fernandez court found that Gillingham erred by relying on a case that did not
interpret the recovery of expert witness fees as costs under 38-6-4(B) and thus,
of expert witness
overturned the portion of Gillinghamthat allowed for the recovery
18
1
fees when the witness did not actually testify in the case.

2. Justice Bosson's Specially Concurring Opinion in Fernandez v. Espaiola
Public School District
Justice Bosson "reluctantly" concurred in the majority opinion.'"9 He asserted his
preference to interpret section 38-6-4(B) as "allowing a more discretionary role for
the trial judge in awarding costs"" 0 but agreed that New Mexico statutes, court
rules, and precedent do not allow trial courts to award expert witness fees as costs
when the expert does not testify at trial."' He further agreed with the majority that
Dunleavy and Gillingham were not adequate authority for an alternative
interpretation of section 38-6-4(B).112 He wrote separately to argue that, as a matter
of public policy, a rule is needed that would "allow the district court discretion to
award additional compensation to 'include a reasonable fee to compensate the
in preparation or investigation prior to the giving of
witness for the time required
13
testimony.'"''
the witness's
A major premise of Justice Bosson's argument was that "considerations of
promoting economy in litigation"1 4 demand that trial courts have this discretion.' '
While the award of costs is mandatory under Rule 1-068, he contended that Rule
1-068 is still subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 1-054.'I6 The recovery of
expert witness fees under Rule 1-054 is expressly limited by section 38-6-4(B) and
thus parties "who rely on the offer of settlement rule may only recover expert
witness fees as costs if the witnesses testify at trial or by deposition.""' 7 Thus, he
concluded a party might reject an offer of settlement "for the sole reason that the
party has no chance to recover costs for expert witness fees, costs that might be
prohibitive, short of going to trial.""' 8
While Justice Bosson agreed with the majority that the court's holding in
Dunleavy v. Millerdid not support an alternative construction of section 38-6-4(B),
he cited Dunleavy as support for his policy argument that allowing discretion to

107.

Fernandez, 2005-NMSC-026,

9, 119 P.3d at 166.

108. Id.
109. Id. (Bosson, C.J., specially concurring).
110. Id.
111. Id.

112. Id. In that Justice Bosson advocated for an alternative construction of the statute and a more flexible
court rule, why didn't he dissent? It is possible that his gracious concurrence reflects both respect for stare decisis
and a pragmatic strategy; amending a court rule requires building consensus among the judiciary. Additionally,
the court can't nullify a statute in an opinion; it must do so through a court rule. See N.M. CONST. art. UL § 1.
113. Fernandez,1 19, 119 P.3d at 169 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 38-6-4(B) (1983)).
114. Id.
115.

Id.

116. Id.
117. ld.
118. Id.

15, 119 P.3d at 168.
16,119 P.3dat 168.
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award expert witness fees as costs would facilitate settlement. " 9 In Dunleavy, the
court acknowledged this policy when it stated that the "district court should carefully scrutinize all costs submitted by the prevailing party in the interest of reducing
insofar as possible the burdensome cost of litigation."' 2 Justice Bosson argued that
these same policy considerations should apply to costs for expert witness fees in the
context of settlement agreements.12 ' He also noted other policy goals affected by the
court's strict interpretation of section 38-6-4(B), such as "promoting offers of
settlement, allowing liberal discovery and discouraging litigation."122
While Justice Bosson agreed with the court's interpretation of section 38-6-4(B),
he also stated that granting trial courts discretion to award costs for expert witnesses
outside of the statutory requirements is consistent with the legislature's approach
to cost recovery. 123 He noted that section 38-6-4(B) expressly allows trial courts
discretion to award additional compensation for expert witnesses beyond per diem
and mileage; therefore, he argued that the circumstance of this provision applying
only when the expert testifies at trial shows not that the legislature intended to
expressly limit the recovery of expert witness fees to trial-type situations, but rather
that the legislature did not contemplate settlements when enacting the statute. 124
Thus, Justice Bosson seemed to argue that a court rule granting discretion to the
trial courts to award expert witness fees as costs, even when the expert does not
testify at trial, is not inconsistent with the legislature's framework for costs recovery
and, therefore, a flexible court rule promulgated by the judiciary would not
125
necessarily create a conflict with the legislature.
D. The New Mexico Judiciary'sRule-Making Authority
Justice Bosson's advocacy of a flexible court rule vesting trial courts with
discretion to award expert witness fees as costs assumes, without explanation, that
the judiciary has authority to promulgate a procedural rule that appears to conflict
with a statute as interpreted by the court. In New Mexico, it is firmly established
that, pursuant to the state constitution, the judiciary has authority to govern matters
of pleading, practice, and procedure. 26
' This authority is not exclusive. It is a power

shared with the legislature. The court will give effect to statutes regulating
procedure unless there is a conflict between statute and court rule governing a

119. Id. 18, 119 P.3d at 168.
120. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. 17, 119 P.3d at 168.
124. Id.
125. See id.
126. See State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 246, 539 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1975) ("[Olur
constitutional power under N.M. Const. art. aII, § 1 and art. V1,§ 3 of superintending control over all inferior courts
carries with it the inherent power to regulate all pleading, practice and procedure affecting the judicial branch of
government.").
Article Ia section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution is the express separation of powers provision,
which directs that "[t]he powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments, the
legislative, executive, and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers

properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the
others." N.M. CONST. art. all, § 1.
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matter of procedure. 127 In the event of a conflict, the court rule prevails. 28 Given the
judicial supremacy over matters of procedure, if costs are considered a matter of
procedure, then thejudiciary acted within its authority when it amended Rule 1-054
to grant trial courts discretion to award expert witness fees as costs when the
witness was reasonably necessary to the litigation.' 29
1. Are Costs Procedural?
The remaining question in determining the judiciary's authority to amend Rule
1-054 to grant courts discretion to award expert witness fees as costs outside the
narrow confines of section 38-6-4(B) is whether costs are procedural or substantive.
The boundary between substance and procedure is often "elusive"' 3 ° but in light of
case law and the language of Rule 1-054, it is clear that in New Mexico costs are
deemed to be procedural.
On its face, the language of Rule 1-054 provides support for a determination that
costs are procedural. The rule states "[c]osts generally are recoverable only as
allowed by statute, Supreme Court rule and case law."'13' The supreme court's
assertion of authority allowing for the recovery of certain costs by rule is an implicit
determination that costs are at least partly procedural. Being procedural, costs are
ultimately governed by the judiciary pursuant to its rule-making authority. This
argument can be criticized as "boot-strapping" because the amended rule seemingly
reflects only the judiciary's understanding of the governance of costs. However, the
co-governance of costs existed well before the amendment to Rule 1-054.132
Additionally, case law supports a finding that costs are procedural in New
Mexico. In Ammerman v. HubbardBroadcasting,Inc., the New Mexico Supreme
Court considered whether a statute creating a privilege protecting journalists from
revealing their confidential informants in ajudicial proceeding constituted a matter
of procedure.' 33 In holding that it did, the court stated that in promulgating the
statute at issue, the legislature attempted to create a rule of evidence comparable to
34
other privileges already contained in the New Mexico Rules of Evidence.' The
court further stated:
[Tlhere is no real question about rules of privilege being rules of evidence, when
considered in the context of being exceptions to the general requirement and
liability of everyone to give testimony or furnish evidence upon all facts inquired
of in a court of justice. They are so considered by every authority about whom
we know who has discussed such rules.'35

127. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307,311,551 P.2d 1354, 1358 (1976).
128. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs. v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 198, 755 P.2d 40, 42 (1988); Albuquerque Rape
Crisis Ctr. v. Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 1 11, 120 P.3d 820, 824.

129. See State Bar of New Mexico, supra note 16, at 26.
130. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 310, 551 P.2d at 1357.

131. Rule 1-054(D)(2) NMRA.
132.

See Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 362, 862 P.2d at 1221 (1993) (discussing the general rule that

trial courts have authority to award costs pursuant to "rule of court or statute").
133. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 307, 551 P.2d at 1354.

134. Id. at 309, 551 P.2d at 1356.
135.

Id.
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Therefore, in Ammerman, the question became whether a rule of evidence is
procedural rather than substantive. The court found that the rules of evidence are
largely-and possibly entirely-procedural, in part because "[t]he very fact of
adoption of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence.. .by this court, is conclusive of its
determination that at least these rules as adopted are procedural.' 36
In the more recent case of Albuquerque Rape Crisis Center v. Blackmer,'37 the
New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed its reasoning inAmmerman. In Blackmer, the
court considered whether a statutorily created privilege protecting information
disclosed by a rape victim to a rape counselor was procedural. In finding that this
evidentiary privilege constituted a matter of procedure, the court cited Ammerman' s
explanation that "rules of privilege are to be considered rules of evidence, and rules
of evidence are procedural." '38 In light of this reasoning, costs are clearly a matter
of procedure in New Mexico. Since costs are governed by Rule 1-054 (a procedural
rule), and are codified in the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure (which are
adopted by the court), costs are treated as procedural. Accordingly, costs are within
the judiciary's rule-making authority. To the extent that the court-modified Rule 1054 conflicts with section
38-6-4(B), a procedural statute, the rule supersedes the
1 39
statutory provision.
II. ANALYSIS
Without Justice Bosson's specially concurring opinion in Fernandez, the
significance of the costs determination when the parties reach a settlement agreement pursuant to Rule 1-068 would have gone unrecognized by the court. Unlike
previous Rule 1-054 cases, the parties in Fernandeztook advantage of Rule 1-068,
a rule promulgated by the court specifically to encourage parties to settle disputes
and avoid the burdensome cost of litigation. 4 ° The end result was that the
Fernandez plaintiffs accepted an offer of judgment for $95,000 plus costs, and
4
unwittingly forfeited the recovery of over $89,000 in expert witness fees as costs.' '
While it may appear that the Fernandezes' only option to avoid such a financial
loss was to decline the defendant's offer of judgment, 42 that was not the case.
Under Rule 1-068, the parties were free to negotiate the recovery of expert witness
fees using traditional contract principles. 143 Thus, rather than accept the defendant's
offer of judgment plus costs, the plaintiffs in Fernandez could have proposed a
counter-offer with an amount that included expert witness fees and other specified
costs while waiving an additional separate assessment of costs by the trial court.'

136. Id. at 310, 551 P.2d at 1357.
137. 2005-NMSC-032, 120 P.3d 820.
138. Id. 1 9 n.2, 551 P.2d at 823 n.2 (citing Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 309-10, 551 P.2d at 1356-57).
139. Ammerman, 89 N.M. at 312, 551 P.2d at 1359.
140. Fernandez v. Espahola Pub. Sch. Dist., 2005-NMSC-026, 2, 119 P.3d at 164.
141. See id. It makes no sense that the plaintiffs would accept a judgment of $95,000 believing they had
$85,000 worth of unrecoverable expert witness fees. Thus, it seems fair to conclude that the plaintiffs believed these
costs would be recoverable when they accepted the defendant's offer of judgment for $95,000.
142. See id. 16, 119 P.3d at 168 (Bosson, C.J., specially concurring).
143. See Shelton v. Sloan, 1999-NMCA-048,1 23, 977 P.2d 1012, 1016 (interpreting an agreement under
Rule 1-068, the offer of judgment rule, by applying traditional contract principles).
144. See id. while Sloan interpreted the language of Rule 1-068 before it became the offer of settlement rule,
the new rule contains the same ten-day timeframe for an offeree to accept an offer of settlement.
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The underlying facts in Fernandez,however, illustrate the potential difficulties that
may arise when parties attempt to recover substantial expert witness fees through
settlement negotiations. In Fernandez, the defendant's offer was for $95,000 plus
costs.'45 The plaintiff s expert witness fees totaled over $89,000.146 Thus, a counteroffer that included expert witness fees would almost double the original offer of
judgment. It is unlikely the defendant would have accepted a counter-offer that
practically doubled its liability. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a circumstance that
would permit these parties to reach a settlement that included full recovery of the
plaintiffs' expert witness fees. Thus, the particular facts underlying Fernandez
demonstrate that the insertion of the recovery of substantial expert witness fees into
the negotiation process could serve as a practical impediment to parties settling
disputes pursuant to Rule 1-068.
One way to resolve this potential impediment to settlement is to grant trial
court's discretion to award costs even when the parties do not go to trial.' 47 Justice
Bosson seems to have argued that a court rule allowing trial courts discretion to
award costs for the work that resulted in compromise and avoidance of litigation
would not cause conflict with the legislature because the new rule would be
consistent with legislative intent, as demonstrated by a provision of section 38-64(B).' 48 Specifically, he argued that in enacting the statute, the legislature
contemplated trial courts having discretion to tax expert witness fees as costs
because the statute provides that a court award reasonable fees for the witness's pretrial preparation, albeit, as interpreted by the court, only when the expert testifies
in the cause.'49
Justice Bosson may well be correct in his assertion that discretion to award
expert witness fees is in accord with the legislature's approach to costs. Indeed,
other statutes governing costs show a clear legislative intent to give judges
discretion to award costs or disallow costs when necessary in the case. For example,
section 39-3-30 directs that "[i]n all civil actions or proceedings of any kind, the
party prevailing shall recover his costs against the other party unless the court
orders otherwise for good cause shown."' 5 Section 39-2-9 states costs for witnesses
shall not "exceed four witnesses, on each side, unless under the discretion of the
court, and in the court's discretion the same may be necessary."'' In each of these
statutory provisions, the trial court is granted discretion in the administration of
costs. In light of these statutes, it appears incongruous to interpret section 38-6-4(B)
as prohibiting a trial court from exercising its discretion to award expert witness
fees as costs when the expert's services were reasonably necessary to the parties
reaching compromises and avoiding litigation.
145. Fernandez, 2005-NMSC-026, 1 2, 119 P.3d at 164.
146. Plaintiff-Petitioner's Brief in Chief at 2, Fernandez,2005-NMSC-026, 119 P.3d 163 (No. 28,648).
147. See Fernandez, 2005-NMSC-026, 117, 119 P.3d at 168 (Bosson, CJ., specially concurring).
148. Id. 1 17, 119 P.3d at 168 (Bosson, C.J., specially concurring); see Albuquerque Rape Crisis Ctr. v.
Blackmer, 2005-NMSC-032, 13, 120 P.3d 820,824 (interpreting a statute governing privilege as consistent with
court rule governing privilege so that there was no conflict between the procedural statute and court rule).
149. Fernandez,2005-NMSC-026,
17, 119 P.3d at 168 (Bosson, C.J., specially concurring).
150. NMSA 1978, § 39-3-30 (1966).
151. Id. § 39-2-9 (1953). Further, § 39-2-10 (1953) provides that when the court is taxing costs for more than
four witnesses, it must "certify upon the record that the attendance of more than four witnesses was necessary in
the case." Id.
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However, this type of argument was unlikely to convince the court to reinterpret
section 38-6-4(B) to allow trial courts discretion to award expert witness fees as
costs when the expert does not testify at trial. This is because the plain language of
section 38-64(B) unambiguously states that the witness must be certified as an
expert and the expert must testify in the case, either by deposition or in person,
before costs may be awarded. "When a statute contains language which is clear and
unambiguous, [the court] must give effect to that language and refrain from further
' In
statutory interpretation."152
addition, case law firmly establishes that the statute
requires that the expert witness testify for costs to be recoverable. Thus, the only
practical solution to the recovery of expert witness fees under Rule 1-068 was for
the judiciary to exercise its power under Ammerman to amend Rule 1-054, thereby
superseding section 38-6-4(B). In effectuating this amendment, the judiciary
furthered the important policies of discouraging litigation, encouraging settlement
and reducing the burdensome cost of litigation.
There is no good reason for preventing New Mexico courts from having this
discretion, particularly since it is consistent with New Mexico public policy. 5 3 It
could be argued that application of section 38-6-4(B) reduced the burdensome cost
of litigation because it discouraged plaintiffs from incurring substantial expert
witness fees in the early stages of litigation if the parties anticipated settling the
case. Even if that were true, the statutory bar to the recovery of these expenses was
an overly restrictive means of accomplishing that goal. Expert witnesses are in
many cases necessary to a party fully developing a claim or a defense. 154 In such
cases, a case could easily be dismissed if not for the expert witness. 15 5 Incases
where the expert is not legally necessary, the expert may still "serve as an
indispensable force of persuasion."15 6 Further, a more moderate rule allowing courts
authority to award expert witness fees as costs only when the expense is reasonably
necessary to the litigation cautions attorneys to exercise restraint in incurring pretrial expert witness fees, thereby still reducing the burdensome cost of litigation.
A potential criticism of the new rule is that the reasonably necessary language
is too ambiguous and will lead to increased litigation regarding its meaning. While
this may be true, it is important to recognize that the trial court will make this
determination in a costs hearing. Thus, any expenses or costs associated with this
matter would be in the form of attorney's fees and therefore would not implicate
expert witness fees.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF AMENDMENT TO RULE 1-054
In light of the foregoing considerations, the New Mexico Supreme Court
amended Rule 1-054 in 2008 to allow the trial court discretion to award expert
witness fees as costs when "the court determines that the expert witness was
reasonably necessary to the litigation."' 5 7 The amendment to Rule 1-054 is likely
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Perea v. Baca, 94 N.M. 624, 627, 614 P.2d 541, 544 (1980).
See Fernandez,2005-NMSC-026, 1 18, 119 P.3d 163, 168 (Bosson, C.J., specially concurring).
See CEciL C. KuHNE l, A LMGATOR'S GUIDE TO EXPERT WrNESSES 3 (2006).
Id.

Id.
See Rule 1-054 NMRA.
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to result in increased settlement under Rule 1-068. As illustrated by the facts
underlying Fernandez v. Espahiola Public School District,requiring a plaintiff to
recover expert witness fees solely through settlement negotiations is likely to
preclude parties in wrongful death actions and other actions involving significant
damages from achieving settlement. Under the new rule, parties now have the
ability to agree to a specified damage award and leave the determination of costs,
particularly those for substantial expert witness fees, to a neutral decisionmaker-the trial judge.
Such a position begs the question of why a party incurring substantial expert
witness fees would chance their non-recovery in post-settlement hearings assessing
costs. Answering this question requires examination of the plaintiff s other options
after the defendant has made an offer of settlement under Rule 1-068. The plaintiff
can deny the defendant's offer of settlement and take a chance at trial, invariably
incurring more expenses, including expert witness trial preparation and testimony
fees. If the plaintiff loses the case, the plaintiff will recover no costs. 58 Even if the
plaintiff prevails in the cause, if the plaintiff recovers a judgment less than the
the defendant's post-offer
defendant's offer of settlement, the plaintiff must 1pay
59
costs.
post-offer
own
her
recover
cannot
costs and
Given the substantial consequences of rejecting a defendant's reasonable
settlement offer, it is not difficult to imagine the plaintiff electing to agree to a
specified damage award and then leaving the recovery of costs for expert witness
fees in the hands of the trial judge."6 Granting trial courts the discretion to award
expert witness fees as costs thus encourages a plaintiff with substantial expert
witness expenses to resolve disputes by accepting a defendant's offers of settlement
and then leaving the determination of costs to the court.
Defendants are also encouraged to make offers of settlement under Rule 1-068
and leave the determination of costs to the trial judge. The rule grants trial courts
discretion to award expert witness fees that were reasonably necessary to the
litigation.' 6 ' The "reasonably necessary" language cautions plaintiffs to exercise
restraint when incurring expert witness fees in the pre-trial phase of litigation and
protects defendants from being automatically taxed with substantial expert witness
fees when entering into Rule 1-068 settlement agreements.
This benefit to defendants under the new rule should not be interpreted to
discourage defendants from making offers of settlement inclusive of a specified
amount for costs. For example, the defendant could offer $75,000 in damages plus
$25,000 in costs. Given such a scenario, the defendant would have made an offer

158. Rule 1-068 NMRA.
159. Id.
160. See Fernandez,2005-NMSC-026,1 20,119 P.3d at 169 (Bosson, CJ., specially concurring) ("I believe
the district court, if given discretion, is in a good position to make an honest assessment of the work that went into
reaching a compromise.") Indeed, in Fernandezthe trial court stated, in dicta, that if it were later determined to
have discretion to award any of the plaintiff's $89,274.25 in costs it would award $450.00 for Michael Baten,
M.D., $16,814.41 for Dr. Robert Wright, Ph.D., $4,952.31 for Brian McDonald, Ph.D., $2,000.00 for Samuel Roll,
Ph.D., and $4,379.20 for Thom Thompson. Plaintiff-Petitioner's Brief in Chief at 2, Fernandez, 2005-NMSC-026,
199 P.3d 163 (No. 28,648). Presumably, these were the expert witness expenses the court found necessary to the
litigation.
161. See State Bar of New Mexico, supra note 16, at 26.
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of settlement in the total amount of $ 100,000 instead ofjust $75,000 if costs had not
been added to the offer. This larger offer could present some practical advantages
for the defendant in the event the plaintiff rejects the defendant's offer of
settlement. This is because under Rule 1-068, the prevailing plaintiff has to pay the
defendant's costs if the plaintiff recovers less than the offer of settlement. Thus, the
plaintiff would have to make a stronger case for damages in order to receive a
judgment that is not less than $100,000, rather than just $75,000, if costs had not
been added to the offer. To determine the total amount of the judgment finally
obtained under Rule 1-068, the court will add to the jury award any pre-offer costs
awarded to the plaintiff.'62 Thus, if the jury awards the plaintiff with a $75,000
judgment and the court then awards $10,000 for costs incurred prior to the
defendant's offer of settlement, the total award considered when determining costs
under Rule 1-068 would be $85,000. In this example, the total judgment, composed
of the jury award plus pre-offer costs, does not reach the $100,000 offer of
settlement and thus the plaintiff would have to pay the defendant's post-offer costs
and could not recover her own post-offer costs. Alternatively, if the court awarded
$26,000 in pre-offer costs, which was then added to the $75,000 jury award, the
plaintiff would then have exceeded the defendant's $100,000 offer of settlement
and, in this situation, the defendant would have to pay double the plaintiff's postoffer costs. Thus, the defendant should consider any pre-offer costs the plaintiff
may have incurred when determining the amount of an offer of settlement.
V. A PROCEDURAL PROBLEM FOR THE RECOVERY OF EXPERT
WITNESS FEES AS COSTS UNDER SECTION 38-6-4(B)
Finally, while the amendment to Rule 1-054 successfully remedies the limitations
on the recovery of expert witness fees to prevailing plaintiffs in a rule 1-068
settlement, the first requirement of section 38-6-4(B) creates a procedural problem
that is inconsistent with New Mexico policy of conserving judicial resources. While
there is no case law on point, the statutory requirement that the witness must qualify
as an expert likely means that a trial court must determine that the expert testimony
is admissible under Rule 11-702 of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence. 163
The first requirement under Rule 11-702 is that the testimony concern "scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge."'" 4 When scientific knowledge is at issue,
the trial court must assess the validity of the particular theory or technique
underlying the testimony by considering the factors enumerated by the United States
Supreme Court in Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. 165 The trial court
does this by conducting a "Daubert" hearing or an on the record voir dire."6 Thus,
pursuant to section 38-6-4(B), when the parties reach a settlement under Rule 1-068,
the trial court may be required to conduct a separate hearing to qualify the witness
as an expert. This produces an incongruous result when parties reach settlement

162. Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 361, 862 P.2d 1212, 1220 (1993).
163. See Rule 11-702 NMRA.

164. Id.
165. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
166.

See State v. Fry, 2006-NMSC-001, 154, 126 P.3d 516, 540-41; see also Daubert,509 U.S. 579.
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under Rule 1-068, because the rule is aimed, in part, at conserving over-taxed
judicial resources.
One potential solution to this incongruity is for the parties to come to an
agreement regarding the qualifications of witnesses prior to asking the court to enter
judgment for the plaintiff. In fact, rather than chance their non-recovery on the basis
of witness qualifications, it would be prudent for plaintiffs to seek stipulation of the
expert's qualifications as part of the negotiation under Rule 1-068. Another idea is
for the judiciary to create a presumption that the witness qualifies as an expert if the
plaintiff identifies this witness on her expert witness list and the opposing party
does not challenge the witness's qualifications. While this presumption would not
necessarily increase the likelihood of the prevailing party recovering expert witness
fees as costs, it would rectify the inconvenient procedural problem created by the
first requirement under section 38-6-4(B) when the witness's qualifications are
uncontested.
Further, thejudiciary has the authority to incorporate this presumption into Rule
1-054 through both its procedural rule-making authority, as discussed in Part I of
this article, and its inherent authority. Pursuant to Article VI, § 1 of the New
Mexico Constitution, thejudiciary "retains certain inherent authority to oversee and
manage its caseload."' 67 This inherent power exists independent of, and cannot be
subject to, statute. 168 While the judiciary shapes the contours of its own inherent
authority, New Mexico courts have limited the definition of inherent authority to
"powers which cannot be dispensed with in a court, because they are necessary to
the exercise of all others. ' 69 Included within these necessary powers is the court's
power to regulate its docket, promote judicial efficiency, and deter frivolous
lawsuits. 7 ' Thus, under this inherent authority, the court has the ability to revise
procedure that is inconsistent with judicial efficiency. The express requirement
under section 38-6-4(B), that the witness be certified as an expert, constitutes a
procedure that is inconsistent with judicial efficiency and, therefore, can be
amended pursuant to the court's inherent authority.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 2008 amendment to Rule 1-054 resolves the inconsistency created by the
prior restrictions to the recovery of expert witness fees as costs under Rule 1-068.
While adding new language to the rule allows the trial courts the discretion to award
costs for experts who were "reasonably necessary" to the litigation, the language of
the new rule may lead to increased litigation by virtue of its ambiguity. Such
additional litigation may be worth the expense in attorney's fees when substantial
expert witness fees are at issue.

167. State v. Gonzales, 2002-NMCA-071, 1 21,49 P.3d 681,685.
168. State ex reL N.M. State Highway and Transp. Dept. v. Baca, 120 N.M. 1, 4, 896 P.2d 1148, 1151
(1995).
169. New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-028, 27,986 P.2d 450,458 (quoting
United States v. Hudson, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812)).
170. Baca, 120 N.M. at 1, 896 P.2d at 1148.
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673

While the amendment to Rule 1-054 helps the prevailing party in a settlement
action by increasing the likelihood that the party will recover expert witness fees as
costs, section 38-6-4(B) of the New Mexico Statutes creates a procedural hurdle that
is inconsistent with the state policy of preserving judicial resources. This hurdle
could be remedied through the parties stipulating to a witness's qualifications prior
to the court entering judgment pursuant to Rule 1-068. In addition, the judiciary
could add a presumption of a witness's qualifications as expert when the plaintiff
includes the expert in the witness list and the witness's qualifications are
unchallenged. Even with the currently existing procedural hurdle, however, the
amendment to Rule 1-054 promotes the policy of encouraging settlement and may,
in fact, increase Rule 1-068 settlement agreements. The amended rule, thus,
represents a change in the law that may be beneficial to litigants in New Mexico
who wish to resolve disputes without time-consuming and expensive trials.

